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I. INTRODUCTION
As described more fully in other papers in this Symposium,1 in what
has come to be called the Jena Six case, District Attorney (“D.A.”) Reed
Walters made several critical charging decisions involving black and white
youths.  Although Walters has defended his decisions as necessary and
proper,2 many critics see his actions—and those of the trial judge3—as ex-
amples of the pervasive racial disparities in the criminal justice system.4
* Charles L.B. Lowndes Professor, Duke Law School.  The author would like to thank
Duke Law research assistants Kristin Collins Cope, Michael Devlin, and Meghan Ferguson for
their able assistance, and colleagues Guy Charles and Robert Mosteller for their valuable
comments.
1 See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz & Carol Steiker, Introduction to the Symposium: The Jena
Six, the Prosecutorial Conscience, and the Dead Hand of History, 44 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L.
REV. 275, 279-83 (2009).
2 See Reed Walters, Op-Ed. Justice in Jena, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A27 (stating
that he would take the same actions but would better explain several points:  the nooses on the
tree did not constitute a crime under state law; the facts revealed a brutal beating rather than a
schoolyard fight; there was serious harm inflicted with a dangerous weapon; and adult charg-
ing status for one particular defendant was appropriate because of his role as the instigator, his
prior criminal record, and the seriousness of the crime).
3 See infra note 21 and accompanying text (describing the removal of the trial judge be- R
cause his inflammatory comments about the defendants created an appearance of impropriety).
4 See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, Race-ing Prosecutor’s Ethics Codes, 44 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L.
REV. 461, 467-69 (2009) (criticizing Walters for disparate charging decisions for black and
white students in the Jena Six case); Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena’s D.A.:  The Prosecutor
and Racial Esteem, 44 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 393, 456-59 (2009) (criticizing Walters for
failing to consider the racial impact of his charging decisions in the Jena Six case); Scott
Farwell, Marching Behind Six Young Men:  Concern for Black Defendants in Louisiana Fills
Texas Buses, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 20, 2007, at 1A (describing 1,000 protesters leav-
ing Texas for civil rights protest in Jena and noting that some see the Jena Six case as “a
symptom of a diseased American legal system, in which laws are colorblind but lawyers and
judges and juries see the world through prisms of racial bias”); Richard Fausset, Protesters
March to Support ‘Jena Six’, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2007, at A-1 (describing crowd of up to
50,000 protestors in Jena and speakers “describing the case as an example of an American
justice system that continued to treat African Americans unfairly”); Leonard Pitts, Still No
Justice in ‘Black Justice’:  Black People Continue to Receive Starkly Unequal Treatment,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 20, 2007, at 13A (noting historic use of criminal justice system
to intimidate blacks and comparing modern cases of “unjust justice,” such as the prosecution
of the Jena Six, Genarlow Wilson, and Marcus Dixon); Peter Whoriskey, Thousands Protest
Blacks’ Treatment:  Six Students Who Were Prosecuted in Louisiana Town Garner Nationwide
Support, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2007, at A1 (describing marches and demonstrations in Jena
and cities throughout the country to protest both the overzealous prosecution of the Jena Six as
well as “unequal treatment black people receive from the criminal justice system every-
where”). But see, e.g., Charlotte Allen, The Case of the Amazing Disappearing Hate Crime,
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The Jena Six charges grew out of a series of interracial clashes at a
Louisiana high school after white students hung nooses from a tree.  After
each incident, the D.A. had to decide whom to charge, which charges were
appropriate, and whether to proceed against any of the minors as adults.  For
example, Robert Bailey, who would later become one of the Jena Six, was
attacked by a white male at a party.  Bailey’s white assailant was charged
with simple battery and sentenced to probation.5  The critical incident oc-
curred a few days later at Jena High School.  The six black students who
came to be known as the Jena Six allegedly attacked a white student, Justin
Barker.6  Accounts concerning the event and the severity of the injuries vary.
By some accounts, Barker was quickly released from the hospital and at-
tended a class ring ceremony that evening.7  D.A. Walters, however, con-
tends that Barker was knocked unconscious and then kicked repeatedly as he
lay defenseless on the floor.8
D.A. Walters charged Mychal Bell and the other Jena Six teens with
multiple offenses, including attempted second degree murder and conspiracy
to commit second degree murder, which meant that they faced up to 100
years in prison if convicted.9  Although five of the Jena Six were juveniles at
the time of the assault, D.A. Walters chose to proceed against the first stu-
dent tried, Mychal Bell, as an adult.  Under Louisiana law, the D.A. had the
unreviewable discretion to proceed against Bell as an adult because of his
WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 21, 2008, at 20 (arguing that professional activists and some journal-
ists promoted very distorted accounts of the events concerning the Jena Six to present it as a
symbol of racial injustice); Raquel Christie, Double Whammy, Editorial, AM. JOURNALISM
REV., Feb.-Mar. 2008, at 18, 22-23 (concluding that national media came late to the Jena Six
story and failed to report important information, including Mychal Bell’s prior record and the
seriousness of Justin Barker’s injuries).
5 A second confrontation involving Bailey occurred the next day.  Accounts of the event
differ.  Bailey and some of his friends reportedly wrestled a shotgun away from Matthew
Windham, 18, who had grabbed it from his truck and threatened them with it.  Windham says
that the youths beat him and stole the shotgun.  Only Bailey was charged with theft of a
firearm, second degree robbery, and disturbing the peace.  John Barr & Nicole Noren, ‘Jena
Six’ Controversy Swirls Around Football Star, ESPN, Sept. 21, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.
com/espn/news/story?id=3030458 (last visited Apr. 3, 2009); see also Howard Witt, Racial
Demons Rear Heads, CHI. TRIB., May 20, 2007, at 6 (describing incident in which a young
white man pulled a shotgun on three black students at a convenience store and was not charged
in the incident).
6 In a later incident, Barker was arrested for bringing a loaded rifle to the parking lot of
Jena High.  Witt, supra note 5 (describing arrest and noting that Barker told police he had R
forgotten the gun was there).
7 Witt, supra note 5 (stating that Barker “was not seriously injured and spent only a few R
hours in the hospital”); Whoriskey, supra note 4 (stating that Barker was knocked unconscious R
but released after treatment and attended the class ring ceremony the same evening); Victim in
Jena Six Case Takes the Stand, KATC.COM, July 2, 2007, http://www.katc.com/Global/story.
asp?S=6719374 (stating that Barker testified that he attended class ring ceremony the night of
the beating, despite a swollen face and temporary blindness in one eye that lasted three weeks).
8 See Walters, supra note 2; see also Christie, supra note 4, at 23 (noting that many ac- R
counts seemed to minimize Barker’s injuries and did not mention his medical expenses).
9 Howard Witt, Charge Reduced in ‘Jena 6’ Case, CHI. TRIB., June 26, 2007, at 4 (describ-
ing initial charges and potential penalties).
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age and the inclusion of the attempted murder charge.10  Walters has de-
fended his decision to charge Bell as an adult on the grounds that he was the
instigator and had a prior record.11  Just as jury selection was about to begin
in Bell’s case, Walters reduced the charges to aggravated second degree bat-
tery and conspiracy to commit that offense.12  These offenses carried a maxi-
mum sentence of twenty-two-and-one-half years.13  Use of a “dangerous
weapon” and serious bodily injury are elements of aggravated second degree
battery.14  At trial, the prosecution argued that Bell used his tennis shoes as a
dangerous weapon.15  Bell was convicted of conspiracy and aggravated sec-
ond degree battery.16
In an unreported decision, the Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed
Bell’s conviction because of the prosecution’s last minute decision to drop
the attempted murder charge.17  Absent this charge, Bell was not subject to
trial as an adult, so his case was sent back to juvenile court.18  Bell remained
in custody throughout the proceedings because he could not provide $90,000
in bail, and several months later he pled guilty to the battery charge as a
juvenile and was sentenced to an eighteen-month juvenile term.19
The five remaining members of the Jena Six still await trial.20  In re-
sponse to a motion filed by these defendants, the judge who presided over
10 See infra notes accompanying Part III.B.
11 See Walters, supra note 2. R
12 See Witt, supra note 9 (describing last minute reduction in the charges against Bell and R
also stating that D.A. Walters offered Bell a plea agreement to a felony with a suspended
sentence that Bell and his family rejected).
13 Second degree aggravated battery is punishable by a maximum term of fifteen years
imprisonment with or without hard labor, and punishment for conspiracy carries a maximum
of one-half of that provided for the object offense. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:34.7B
(2007) (aggravated second degree battery); 14:26C (2007) (conspiracy).
14 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:34.7A(1) (2007) (defining aggravated second degree
battery as “a battery committed with a dangerous weapon when the offender intentionally
inflicts serious bodily injury”).
15 Howard Witt, ‘Jena 6’ Conviction Vacated:  Louisiana Beating Case Stirred Cries of
Racism, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 15, 2007, at 1 (reporting that D.A. Walters originally charged the
Jena Six with attempted murder, later reduced the charges to aggravated second degree battery,
and argued at trial that the tennis shoes Bell was wearing constituted a dangerous weapon).
16 Christie, supra note 4, at 19-20 (noting that between June 25 and 28, 2007, Bell was R
convicted of aggravated second degree battery and conspiracy to commit that offense, and that
in August 2007 the trial judge sent the conspiracy case back to juvenile court and upheld the
battery conviction).
17 State v. Bell, No. KW 07-01129, 2007 La. App. Unpub. LEXIS 40, at *1 (La. App. 3d
Cir., Sept. 18, 2007).
18 Although there was no published decision, it appears that the court accepted the de-
fense’s theory of the appeal. See, e.g., Witt, supra note 15 (stating that Louisiana’s Third R
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled Bell should not have been tried as an adult and overturned his
conviction).
19 Associated Press, Teenager in Jena Six Pleads Guilty to Lesser Charge, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 2007, at A24 (reporting Bell’s guilty plea to a juvenile charge of second degree battery
in return for an eighteen-month sentence, with credit for the ten months he had already
served).
20 Some press accounts of the Bell case state that, under pressure from national civil rights
groups, the prosecutor also reduced the charges against some of the other defendants in 2007.
See, e.g., Richard D. Jones, Conviction in Racially Tinged Louisiana Case Is Overturned, N.Y.
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Bell’s case was removed from their cases because his statements that the
teens were “troublemakers” and “a violent bunch” created an appearance of
impropriety.21
These events raise questions about the procedural protections available
to juveniles charged with serious offenses, particularly the adequacy of the
remedies to challenge prosecutorial discretion and disparate treatment by the
prosecution.  They also raise questions concerning the boundary line be-
tween the juvenile and adult criminal justice systems and the applicability of
harsh sanctions to juvenile offenders.  Although D.A. Walters dropped the
attempted murder charge and an appellate court reversed Bell’s conviction
and remanded his case to the juvenile court, Bell’s case stands as a stark
reminder of the dramatic impact of transferring juveniles to the jurisdiction
of the adult criminal courts and the extremely harsh penalties they may face.
Changes enacted in virtually every state during the 1990s made it much
easier to prosecute juveniles as adults and increased the sanctions applicable
to juveniles.  This legislation was part of the “tough on crime” hyperpuni-
tiveness of that period.  The juvenile justice legislation paralleled the efforts
in the adult criminal justice system to enact three strikes and other
mandatory minimum punishment statutes, as well as longer sentences in
general.22  Racial imagery and racially based political appeals played an im-
portant role in creating the climate that led to the enactment of this legisla-
tion.23  In addition, politicians and the media warned the public that we faced
a new breed of youthful superpredators and cold-blooded killers, as well as a
demographic threat of a huge increase in juvenile crime.24  The reforms en-
acted in this climate seem to stand in sharp contrast to both the initial con-
cept of the juvenile courts and to the juvenile justice reforms of the 1960s,
which were spurred by a series of Supreme Court decisions extending many
of the constitutional rights applicable in criminal courts to juvenile proceed-
ings.25  Under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Supreme
Court’s criminal procedure decisions fundamentally reshaped not only the
adult criminal justice system, but also the juvenile justice system.  This Arti-
cle will assess the impact of both the Warren Court’s procedural reforms and
the new juvenile justice legislation, particularly on minority youth, focusing
on the role of prosecutorial discretion and race.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2007, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/15/us/15jena2.
html (“Facing increasing pressure from national civil rights groups, prosecutors in recent
weeks have reduced the charges against some of the other defendants, who are yet to face
trial.”).
21 Associated Press, Judge Ousted for Remarks, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2, 2008, at 4 (reporting
removal of Judge J. P. Mauffray for calling the defendants “troublemakers” and “a violent
bunch”).
22 See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. R
23 See infra notes 146-61 and accompanying text. R
24 See infra notes 162-68 and accompanying text. R
25 See infra Part III.
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This Article comes first to the surprising conclusion that race was al-
most entirely absent from the Warren Court’s criminal procedure opinions,
and that the Court’s constitutional rulings have little to offer to defendants
such as the Jena Six.  Although the Warren Court was well aware of the
problems of racial oppression and its effects in the criminal justice system, it
did not respond directly to those problems.  Instead, the Court adopted race-
neutral procedural mechanisms to increase the general fairness of the crimi-
nal justice process, and it imposed no real check on the discriminatory exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion.  The Court recognized the possibility that the
discriminatory exercise of law enforcement authority could violate the Equal
Protection Clause, but made it virtually impossible to prove such a claim.
The Warren Court did extend the right to trial by jury to a wide range of
cases in the state systems, and it enforced the right to a jury drawn from a
cross-section of society from which the prosecutor could not exclude indi-
vidual jurors on the basis of their race.26  To some extent the right to a jury
trial serves as a check on racial bias or discrimination by the prosecutor, but
that check is not available in the juvenile court system.27  Thus the defend-
ants in the Jena Six prosecution and other juvenile defendants have no real
means of challenging the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion in their cases.
The absence of judicial oversight of discretionary decisions sets the
stage for an evaluation of the statutory reforms of the juvenile justice system
in Louisiana and elsewhere during the 1990s.  Two key features stand out.
First, the legislation reflects a judgment that juvenile courts’ traditional com-
mitment to rehabilitation must give way to the need to protect the public,
particularly in cases of violent offenses.  Accordingly, the new legislation
generally restricts the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts and removes more
cases to the criminal courts.  Second, discretion to treat juveniles as adults
has shifted from the courts to prosecutors.  Louisiana’s system is particularly
harsh, and it offers multiple ways to move a case from the juvenile courts to
the criminal courts.  In general, the prosecutor’s decision is not subject to
judicial review under state law.
The absence of judicial review or oversight of discretionary decisions
by the prosecutor, as well as others such as police and probation officers, is
especially troubling because of the mounting evidence that racial imagery,
stereotypes, and prejudice affect the multiple discretionary judgments made
in the juvenile justice system.  Neither the Constitution nor state law pro-
vides judicial oversight or review.
26 See infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text. R
27 See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. R
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II. THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION AND THE FIRST
REFORM OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
As the Supreme Court recognized most recently in Roper v. Simmons,28
juveniles are different from adults.  The juvenile justice system is separate
from the criminal justice system for precisely this reason.  From its inception
at the turn of the century, the juvenile justice system has been based upon
the view that the state’s role in juvenile justice should be benevolent and
paternalistic.29
Because of their immaturity, rehabilitation—rather than punishment—
should be the overriding social purpose when juveniles are involved in anti-
social or criminal activity.  The original procedures of the juvenile courts
reflected this conception of the courts’ function:  they assumed that the rigid-
ity and technicality of the criminal process were unnecessary and un-
helpful.30  Instead of an adversarial process intended to determine guilt or
innocence, the juvenile court was to determine what was in the child’s best
interest.31
Under Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Supreme Court brought about the
first major reforms of the juvenile justice system.  The Warren Court decided
a series of cases that so fundamentally reshaped the criminal justice system
that they came to be known as the criminal procedure revolution,32 and many
of those decisions were eventually extended to the juvenile courts.  Although
28 543 U.S. 551, 569-71 (2005) (recognizing juveniles’ lack of maturity and reduced sense
of responsibility, greater susceptibility to negative influences and outside pressures, including
peer pressure, and less settled or formed character).
29 For an introduction to the history and theory of the juvenile courts, see BARRY C. FELD,
BAD KIDS:  RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 46-78 (1999) [hereinaf-
ter FELD, BAD KIDS] ; ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS (2d ed. 1977); Janet E. Ains-
worth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order:  The Case for Abolishing
the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1096-97 (1991); see also Barry C. Feld, Violent
Youth and Public Policy:  A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965,
969 (1995); David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of the Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth
Century:  Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
42 (Margaret K. Rosenheim, Franklin E. Zimring, David S. Tanenhaus & Bernardine Dohrn
eds., 2002).
30 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1967) (reviewing scholarly literature).
31 One doctrinal justification was the theory that a child, unlike an adult, has no right to
liberty, and hence the state, acting as parens patriae, does not violate any right when it takes a
child into custody. Id. at 16. But see PLATT, supra note 29, at 159 (arguing that the adoption R
of the parens patriae justification for juvenile court was “an ex post facto fiction” designed to
give spurious legitimacy to the new court).
32 For a general description of some of the major cases comprising the criminal procedure
revolution, see, for example, CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
REVOLUTION 18-36 (1993); Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero?  Re-
thinking the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1361, 1373-1420 (2004); and Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Constitution and the Police:  Individ-
ual Rights and Law Enforcement, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 12-17 (1988).
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the Warren Court decided hundreds of criminal cases,33 the landmark cases
of the revolution were decided in an intense eight-year period from 1961 to
1968.34  These included Mapp v. Ohio (1961),35 which enunciated the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule, Gideon v. Wainwright (1964),36 which held
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applied in state proceedings, and
best known of all, Miranda v. Arizona (1965),37 which required suspects to
be informed of their rights during custodial interrogation.  Three years later,
in Duncan v. Louisiana,38 the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to
jury trial applies to the states.
The Warren Court soon turned its attention to the juvenile justice sys-
tem.  Gerald Gault’s case reached the Court in 1966 and was decided in
1967.39  Fifteen-year-old Gerald had been adjudicated a delinquent and or-
dered to be confined in the state industrial school until he was twenty-one.40
Although Gerald and his parents were not formally advised of the charges
against him, the court records “listed the charge as ‘Lewd Phone Calls.’” 41
Gerald was not represented by a lawyer, and his parents were given only a
general notice of the proceeding, which was short and informal.42  The state
called no witnesses, there was no transcript, and the parties later disputed
whether Gerald had admitted making any of the lewd statements.43  State law
did not provide for an appeal, so Gerald’s parents petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus to obtain his release.44
The case presented the question whether the rights afforded to criminal
defendants were applicable in juvenile proceedings.  The Supreme Court
recognized as the purpose of the juvenile court system its “therapeutic atti-
tude,” historically provided by “benevolent and wise institutions.”45  It con-
trasted that aspiration with the “reality” that Gerald had been “committed to
an institution where he may be restrained of liberty for years.”46  After
describing what incarceration in the industrial school would entail,47 the
Court concluded:
33 See Francis A. Allen, The Quest for Penal Justice:  The Warren Court and the Criminal
Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 519 (stating that during Chief Justice Warren’s tenure the Court
decided more than 600 criminal cases).
34 See Schulhofer, supra note 32, at 12-13. R
35 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
36 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
37 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
38 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
39 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
40 Id. at 8.
41 Id. at 7.
42 Id. at 6 (quoting the notice, which merely states the time and date for “further Hearings
on Gerald’s delinquency”).
43 Id. at 5-7.
44 Id. at 8.
45 Id. at 26.
46 Id. at 27.
47 The Court noted that regardless of the “euphemistic” term “industrial school,” Gerald
would be separated from his family and “confined” to a “world” of “‘regimented routine and
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In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did
not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care im-
plied in the phrase ‘due process.’  Under our Constitution, the con-
dition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court. . . . The
essential difference between Gerald’s case and a normal criminal
case is that safeguards available to adults were discarded in Ger-
ald’s case.  The summary procedure as well as the long commit-
ment was possible because Gerald was 15 years of age instead of
over 18.48
Accordingly, the Court held that Due Process required that a juvenile
must be given adequate notice of the charges against him, the assistance of
counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege
against compelled self incrimination.49  The Court did not, however, cast
doubt upon the continued existence of juvenile courts.  Rather, it indicated
that due process standards, “intelligently and not ruthlessly administered,”
would be compatible with the “substantive benefits of the juvenile
process.”50
The Court left open the question whether the other procedural rights
associated with the criminal trial would also be enforced in juvenile proceed-
ings, and indeed whether juvenile court processes would have to fully mimic
criminal cases.  The Court held in In re Winship that proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt is required in juvenile proceedings.51  However, in McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania the Court rejected the claim that juveniles have a right to trial
by jury in juvenile court,52 reasoning that imposing all the formalities of a
criminal trial on the juvenile process would cast doubt upon the continued
existence of a separate juvenile court system.53  Justice Blackmun’s plurality
opinion opposed the notion of remaking juvenile proceedings “into a fully
adversary process,” and refused to close the door on “what has been the
idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding.”54  The
plurality referred sympathetically to the aspects “of fairness, of concern, of
sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court system
contemplates.”55
institutional hours’” with “guards, custodians, state employees, and ‘delinquents’” who might
be there “for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide.” Id. (citing In re Holmes,
109 A.2d 523, 530 (Pa. 1954) (Musmanno, J., dissenting)).
48 Id. at 27-29.
49 Id. at 31-57.
50 Id. at 21.
51 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
52 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1976).  For a discussion of McKeiver and a review of subsequent
state law and practice, see Tina Chen, Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to a Jury Trial:  Why
Is It a Fundamental Right for Adults and Not Juveniles?, 28 J. JUV. L. 1, 6-7 (2007).
53 403 U.S. at 551.
54 Id. at 545.
55 Id. at 550.
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III. THE NEW PUNITIVENESS AND THE SECOND REFORM OF THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
The second round of sweeping change in the juvenile court system
arose from legislative rather than judicial change.  Like the first round of
change, which had its roots in the broad procedural changes affecting the
criminal justice system, this second round of change was also driven by
strong currents that affected the criminal justice system as a whole.  Begin-
ning in the late 1970s and peaking during the 1990s, a host of punitive poli-
cies were adopted by Congress and every state.  In most jurisdictions these
changes included (1) increasing the length of sentences for some or all of-
fenses and (2) revising the sentencing laws to require the imposition of
mandatory or mandatory minimum sentences.56  For example, many states
adopted the “three strikes” laws requiring life imprisonment for recidivists
during this period.57  This increase in sentence severity helped fuel unprece-
dented growth in the U.S. prison population and the national rate of incarcer-
ation.  Between 1987 and 2007, the national prison population nearly
tripled.58  For the first time, more than one in every one hundred adults is
confined in an American jail or prison.59
During the mid-1990s, as states were increasing the severity of
sentences, many states also sought to make the conditions of incarceration
harsher.  For example, during a single year, thirty states abolished various
inmate privileges ranging from weightlifting and family visits to furloughs
to attend family funerals.60  Most remarkably, eight states reintroduced the
chain gang, in which shackled inmates work outside the prison walls.61
A. The National Trends in Juvenile Justice
The same currents that drove the changes in the adult criminal justice
system brought a demand for changes in the juvenile justice system as well.
56 See Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy:  How
Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 405-06 (2006).
57 The phrase “three strikes” is a baseball analogy:  after three strikes, you are “out,” i.e.,
subject to harsher penalties.  After California and Washington State adopted their three strikes
laws in 1994, twenty-two states and the federal government adopted new laws enhancing pun-
ishments for repeat felony offenders. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 15, 30 (2003)
(holding twenty-five-year-to-life sentence under California’s three strikes law for theft of three
golf clubs did not violate the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment); see
also Michael G. Turner & Jody L. Sundt, Three Strikes and You’re Out Legislation:  A National
Assessment, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1995, at 16, 17. See generally JOHN CLARK, JAMES AUSTIN
& D. ALAN HENRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, “THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT”:  A REVIEW OF
STATE LEGISLATION (1997).
58 PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100:  BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 5 (2008),
available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTS_Prison08_FINAL
_2-1-1_FORWEB.pdf.
59 Id. at 3.
60 Beale, supra note 56, at 406. R
61 Id. at 407.
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During the 1990s, there was a fundamental shift in juvenile justice policy.
As Barry Feld explained:
Increasingly, people and politicians view juvenile courts’ tradi-
tional commitment to rehabilitation as a bias toward leniency often
to the detriment of protecting the public or satisfying the victim.
For more than three decades, conservatives have denounced juve-
nile courts for “coddling” young criminals, and, more recently,
state legislatures have adopted more punitive policies toward
young offenders in both the juvenile and criminal justice
systems.62
These pressures led to constriction of the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts
by a number of mechanisms:  making it easier to transfer some juveniles to
criminal court, removing some serious crimes from juvenile court jurisdic-
tion regardless of the juvenile’s age, and lowering the age of eligibility for
criminal prosecutions.63
The National Center for Juvenile Justice surveyed state laws in the mid-
1990s and found that a fundamental shift was occurring:
Traditional notions of individualized disposition based upon the
best interest of the juvenile are being diminished by interests in
punishing criminal behavior.  Inherent in many of these changes is
the belief that serious and violent juvenile offenders must be held
more accountable for their actions.  Accountability is, in many in-
stances, defined as punishment or a period of incarceration with
less attention paid to the activities to be accomplished during that
incarceration.  Toward that end, dispositions are to be offense
based rather than offender based, with the goal of punishment
rather than rehabilitation.64
All states allow juveniles to be tried as adults under certain circum-
stances, by way of transfer laws.  States use one of three mechanisms to
determine which cases will be transferred to criminal court:  judicial transfer
(also called judicial waiver), statutory exclusion (also called “mandatory” or
“automatic” transfer), and prosecutorial discretion (also called “direct fil-
ing”).65  Furthermore, in many states multiple mechanisms are in place.66
Between 1992 and 1995, forty states adopted or modified laws making it
62 FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 29, at 189-90; see also Barry C. Feld, The Politics of Race R
and Juvenile Justice:  The “Due Process Revolution” and the Conservative Reaction, 20 JUST.
Q. 765 (2003) (placing the get-tough movement in a larger social and political context).
63 FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 29, at 191. R
64 PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND
VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME xi (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/statresp.pdf.
65 R.E. Redding & B.S. Mrozoski, Adjudicatory and Dispositional Decision-Making in
Juvenile Justice, in JUVENILE DELINQUENCY:  PREVENTION, ASSESSMENT, AND INTERVENTION
232, 236-37 (Kirk Heilbrun, Naomi E. Sevin Goldstein & Richard E. Redding eds., 2005).
66 Id. at 237.
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easier to prosecute juveniles as adults in criminal court, and forty-seven
states and the District of Columbia made changes in their laws targeting
juveniles who commit serious or violent crimes.67  In contrast to the tradi-
tional regime, which based dispositions on the needs of the juvenile with the
goal of rehabilitation, the states increasingly focused on the offense, with a
goal of punishment.68  Indeed, by 1997 about one-third of the states had en-
acted laws redefining the purpose of their juvenile courts to emphasize pub-
lic safety, certain sanctions, and/or the accountability of offenders.69
The new state laws expanded the types of offenses and offenders eligi-
ble for transfer from the juvenile court system to the adult criminal court.70
They lowered the minimum age for transfer, increased the number of trans-
fer-eligible offenses, or expanded prosecutorial discretion and reduced judi-
cial discretion in transfer decision-making.  Twenty-nine states have enacted
statutory exclusions, which have removed a large number of cases from the
juvenile justice system.71  For example, thirteen states have set the upper age
for juvenile court jurisdiction at fifteen or sixteen.72  Other states grant the
power to remove individual juvenile cases to the prosecutor, rather than the
judge.  By 2004, fifteen states had authorized concurrent jurisdiction over
some cases in both the juvenile and criminal courts and had given prosecu-
tors the discretion to file cases against juveniles in either system.73  In gen-
eral, the prosecutor’s decision in these cases is equated to the routine
exercise of charging discretion, and is not subject to judicial review or
oversight.74
All the reforms shared the same general purpose:  “to ease and support
the State’s decision to punish, hold accountable, and incarcerate for longer
periods of time those juveniles who had, by instant offense or history, passed
a threshold of tolerated ‘juvenile’ criminal behavior.”75  As a result, the num-
ber of juveniles being charged and tried in criminal court increased, as did
the number of those detained and incarcerated in adult correctional
institutions.76
67 TORBET ET AL., supra note 64, at 3, 59. R
68 Id. at xi.
69 PATRICIA TORBET & LINDA SZYMANSKI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE LEGISLATIVE
RESPONSES TO VIOLENT CRIME:  1996-97 UPDATE (1998), available at http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.
org/jjbulletin/9811/judicial.html.
70 RICHARD E. REDDING, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE TRANSFER LAWS:  AN EFFEC-
TIVE DETERRENT TO DELINQUENCY? 1 (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
ojjdp/220595.pdf.
71 H.N. SNYDER & M. SICKMUND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VIC-
TIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 111, 112 (2006), available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/
nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf.
72 Id. at 114.
73 Id. at 113.
74 Id.
75 TORBET ET AL., supra note 64, at xv. R
76 Id. at 6.
\\server05\productn\H\HLC\44-2\HLC207.txt unknown Seq: 12 27-MAY-09 9:24
522 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 44
The reforms had a major effect on the allocation of authority, shifting
authority to determine whether cases should be handled in the juvenile jus-
tice system from the courts to prosecutors.77  This occurs in states with
prosecutorial direct filing, but it is also present in other jurisdictions that
exclude particular offenses from the juvenile courts, since the prosecutor
often has discretion in the choice of offenses.78
B. Juvenile Justice in Louisiana
Although most states enacted laws in the mid-1990s to deal more se-
verely with juvenile crime, Louisiana’s juvenile justice system is particularly
harsh.  Indeed, Louisiana was one of the few states that cracked down in
every major category tracked by national researchers.79
Louisiana has both judicial waiver and statutory exclusions from juve-
nile jurisdiction based upon age as well as offense type.  By setting the max-
imum age for juvenile court jurisdiction at sixteen, Louisiana requires all
seventeen-year-olds to be prosecuted in criminal court.80  It also mandates
the transfer to criminal court for offenders aged fifteen or older who are
charged with first or second degree murder, aggravated rape, or aggravated
kidnapping (as well as any lesser included offenses that accompany these
charges).81  Judicial waiver on the motion of the prosecutor or the court is
authorized for juveniles who were at least fourteen at the time of the offense
if they are charged with serious violent offenses.82
Most importantly for our purposes, Louisiana prosecutors have wide
discretion, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, to send a case to either the
juvenile or the criminal justice system.  Under Louisiana law, the scope of
concurrent jurisdiction is quite broad.  It includes all juveniles fifteen years
or older who have been charged with a wide range of crimes, including
offenses against the person, as well as specified property and drug of-
77 Id. at xv, xvi; see also Eric C. Klein, Note, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid:  An
Analysis of the Role of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
371, 395 (1998).
78 Klein, supra note 77, at 397 (explaining that the prosecutor also has discretion to move R
for a judicial waiver and prosecutor’s discretionary choice of initial charges is determinative
for charges subject to statutory exclusion).
79 TORBET ET AL., supra note 64, at xv.  The categories were wider transfer provisions, R
broader sentencing authority, less confidentiality of juvenile court records, broader victims’
rights, and increased correctional programs.
80 LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 804 (2008).  At the other end of the range, Louisiana allows
trial in the juvenile courts of children as young as ten years of age. Id.
81 LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305(A)(1)-(2) (2008); see also PATRICK GRIFFIN, NAT’L
CENTER FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE PROFILES:  LOUISIANA TRANSFER PRO-
VISIONS (2008), available at http://www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles.
82 LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 857(A)(1)-(8) (2008) (including first or second degree mur-
der, aggravated kidnapping or rape, aggravated battery involving discharge of a gun, armed
robbery committed with a gun, and forcible rape committed upon a child at least two years
younger than the rapist).
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fenses.83  For cases that meet these criteria, the prosecutor has three options:
(1) obtain a grand jury indictment, bypassing the juvenile system altogether;
(2) file criminal charges without a grand jury indictment, which results in a
transfer of the case to the criminal court if the juvenile court finds probable
cause for the charges; or (3) file a delinquency petition, giving jurisdiction to
the juvenile court.84
In essence, Louisiana law has multiple mechanisms that create a ratchet
toward criminal jurisdiction.  Seventeen year old juveniles are not eligible
for juvenile court, and all of the most serious charges against juveniles aged
fifteen or older must go to criminal court.  There is no mechanism allowing
the criminal court to transfer individual cases back to the juvenile system,
even if the court concludes that a juvenile court would be the more appropri-
ate venue.85  Even if a juvenile pleads guilty to or is convicted of a lesser
included offense—rather than the offense that removed the case from the
juvenile justice system—the criminal court retains jurisdiction.86  On the
other hand, if the prosecutor initially elects to bring the case in juvenile court
or the case does not meet the other criteria noted above, the juvenile court
may use its discretion to transfer the case to the criminal system.  The prose-
cutor’s discretionary choice to bring the case in the punitive criminal justice
system rather than the juvenile justice system is unreviewable,87 though the
court has discretion to override the prosecutor’s decision to bring the case in
the juvenile system.
The key Louisiana provisions were revised multiple times during the
1990s, including, for example, a variety of statutes that lowered the age for
statutory exclusion from juvenile court jurisdiction88 and added various of-
fenses to the jurisdictional provisions.89  Louisiana also adopted an addi-
tional law in 1997 that deserves mention, though it is no longer in force.
83 LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305(B)(3) (2008); SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 71, at R
113; see also GRIFFIN, supra note 81 (noting additional offenses eligible for this transfer mech- R
anism include attempted murder, manslaughter, aggravated oral sexual battery, and a second or
subsequent aggravated battery or burglary, as well as certain controlled substance violations).
84 GRIFFIN, supra note 81; see also LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305(B)(3)-(4) (2008). R
85 About half of the states provide for such a mechanism, which is referred to as a “re-
verse waiver.”  Although reverse waiver provisions are common, Louisiana is one of the
twenty-five states that make no provision for reverse waivers. See SNYDER & SICKMUND,
supra note 71, at 111. R
86 LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305(D) (2008) (providing that the “court exercising crimi-
nal jurisdiction shall retain jurisdiction over the child’s case, even though he pleads guilty to or
is convicted of a lesser offense” and that “[a] plea to or conviction of a lesser included
offense shall not revest jurisdiction in the court exercising juvenile jurisdiction over such
child”).
87 Cf. State v. Dixon, 712 So. 2d 1078, 1081 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that no notice or
hearing is required before prosecutor sends a case to criminal court by obtaining an indictment
charging a juvenile with an offense that subjects him to that court’s exclusive jurisdiction under
LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 305(A)(1)).
88 Act Effective Aug. 27, 1994, 1994 La. Acts 710, 710-13; Act Effective Aug. 27, 1994,
1994 La. Acts 779, 779-82.
89 See, e.g., Act Effective Aug. 15, 1995, 1995 La. Acts 1033, 1033-34; Act Effective Aug.
15, 1995, 1995 La. Acts 2597, 2597-98; Act Effective Aug. 15, 1995, 1995 La. Acts 1647,
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The 1997 law allowed the transfer of juveniles to an adult correctional facil-
ity to serve the remainder of their juvenile disposition as soon as they
reached the age of seventeen.90  Although this provision was justified as a
measure to free up bed space in the juvenile facilities, it subjected the trans-
ferred juveniles to the same conditions as adult felons, including hard la-
bor.91  Thus, in the case of individuals who entered the system as juveniles
but then reached the age of seventeen, the legislature authorized state author-
ities to abandon any pretense of special rehabilitative treatment.  The Louisi-
ana Supreme Court held that the new law violated due process under the
state constitution.92  Because the legislation and accompanying regulations
deprived the juvenile adjudication of its central rehabilitative focus, the state
could not impose these sanctions in a proceeding in which the juveniles were
not accorded the right to trial by jury.93
With this exception, the Louisiana courts have upheld the constitution-
ality of the state legislative scheme.  The state courts have found that the
statutory classifications bear a rational relationship to the state’s interest in
protecting its citizens by exposing older minors accused of committing seri-
ous and violent felonies to the procedures and sanctions of the adult criminal
justice system, and that the statutes are a proper exercise of the state’s police
powers.94
IV. RACE AND THE TWO WAVES OF REFORM
The Jena Six prosecutions put the issue of race front and center, and
require us to ask what role, if any, race played in the developments described
in Parts II and III, and how those developments affect individual juveniles
such as the Jena Six.  The answer is complex.  In the case of the judicially
inspired reforms, it is generally understood that responding to racial discrim-
ination and abuse was an important factor motivating the Warren Court, but,
curiously, race was almost entirely absent from the Court’s criminal proce-
dure opinions.  The Court chose to adopt race-neutral procedural mecha-
nisms to increase the fairness of the criminal justice process in the South and
2647-48 (adding aggravated burglary, aggravated sexual battery, and aggravated sexual battery
committed with firearm).
90 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:902.1 (2007) (authorizing rules and regulations to enable the
transfer of adjudicated juvenile delinquents to adult correctional facilities when the delinquents
have attained the age of seventeen years, the age of full criminal responsibility).
91 In re C.B., 708 So. 2d 391, 393-94, 399 (La. 1998) (describing background of legisla-
tion and its effect).
92 Id. at 396-400.
93 Id. at 400.
94 See, e.g., State v. Perique, 439 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (La. 1983) (holding that de facto
transfer to adult court for juveniles accused of specific offenses under statutory predecessor to
§ 305 is valid exercise of state’s police powers that does not deprive juvenile of any right);
State v. Leach, 425 So. 2d 1232, 1236-37 (La. 1983) (holding that legislative classification by
age and offense committed does not violate equal protection); State v. Pilcher, 655 So. 2d 636,
641 (La. App. 1995) (reaffirming Perique and Leach and holding constitution does not require
hearing prior to transfer of individual juvenile).
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elsewhere, but it imposed no real check on prosecutorial discretion.  Al-
though it recognized the possibility that the discriminatory exercise of law
enforcement authority could violate the Equal Protection Clause, the Court
made it all but impossible to prove such a claim.  The Court did extend the
right to trial by jury to a wide range of cases in the state system, and it
enforced the right to a jury drawn from a cross section from which the prose-
cutor could not exclude individual jurors on the basis of their race.  To some
extent, the right to a jury trial serves as a check on racial bias or discrimina-
tion by the prosecutor, though even that check is unavailable in the juvenile
court system.
The Jena Six incident shows that the Warren Court reforms have little to
offer if the problem is—as critics charge—the comparatively harsh treat-
ment of black as opposed to white defendants.  The defendants in the Jena
Six prosecution had no real means of challenging the prosecutor’s seemingly
inequitable exercise of discretion in their cases.
In the case of the more recent legislative reforms, race played a more
troubling role.  As discussed below, although an increase in crime rates
played an important role in spurring the trends toward increasing punitive-
ness in the criminal justice system and restricting the jurisdiction of the juve-
nile courts, both politicians and the news media played an important role as
well.  Politicians played the race card consciously or unconsciously, and
both the politicians and the news media claimed that the public faced a new
threat from cold-blooded juvenile “super-predators.”  The news media also
increased the coverage of crime news, despite falling crime rates, and cov-
ered it in a manner that promoted racial stereotypes and increased support
for punitive policies affecting the criminal and juvenile justice systems.  The
harsh criminal justice policies adopted during this period have had a dispro-
portionately severe effect on racial minorities, and this impact is magnified
by the fact that unconscious racism and stereotypes affect individual deci-
sions at each stage of the process.
A. Race and the Criminal Procedure Revolution
Under Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Supreme Court pursued multiple
agendas, combining a vigorous pursuit of equality and civil liberty (most
notably school desegregation,95 political reapportionment,96 and voting
rights97) with the seminal criminal procedure cases described in Part I.  It
seems beyond dispute that the Warren Court was very much aware of the
95 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that state’s assign-
ment of students to schools on the basis of race violated Equal Protection Clause).
96 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209-10 (1962) (holding that the reapportionment
of state legislative districts is not a political question and is justiciable by the federal courts).
97 See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960) (holding that the redrawing
of Tuskegee’s electoral district to exclude virtually all black voters violated the Fifteenth
Amendment).
\\server05\productn\H\HLC\44-2\HLC207.txt unknown Seq: 16 27-MAY-09 9:24
526 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 44
crushing racial oppression of blacks in the southern states, and its relation-
ship to the criminal justice system.  Indeed, criminal cases involving the
brutalization and mistreatment of black defendants in the South formed what
one scholar has called “the racial origins of modern criminal procedure”:
cases before 1940 in which the Supreme Court interpreted the Due Process
Clause to invalidate the state criminal convictions of black defendants who
were beaten until they confessed, who were given no more than sham coun-
sel, or whose trials were dominated by violent mobs outside the
courthouse.98
During the critical period of 1961 to 1968, in which the Warren Court
decided the core cases of the criminal procedure revolution, both the Court’s
own docket and the nightly news made it impossible to ignore the legal
travesties of Jim Crow justice in the South and the brutality and racial ani-
mus of southern law enforcement authorities.  Many cases arising from the
civil rights protests in the South made their way to the Court.  In 1964, for
example, the Court held that the South Carolina courts had denied the due
process rights of civil rights protestors by giving the state trespass law an
expansive new interpretation and applying that interpretation retroactively to
the demonstrators.99  In 1966, the Court unanimously reversed the dismissal
of an indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 242 charging the deputy sheriff of
Neshoba County, Mississippi with conspiring to release civil rights workers
Michael Schwerner, James Earl Chaney, and Andrew Goodman from jail at
night and later intercepting, assaulting, and killing them, then disposing of
their bodies.100  The coverage in the national news media also made it impos-
sible to ignore the violent attacks by law enforcement officials on black
demonstrators in the South.  Some of the most indelible images from the
period showed police deploying vicious police dogs and high pressure hoses
on peaceful demonstrators, many of whom were children, and state and local
police armed with billy clubs, tear gas, and bull whips attacking peaceful
civil rights marchers at Selma’s Edmund Pettis Bridge.101  These events were
heavily covered on television and in national newspapers, and the wide-
98 Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 48, 48 & n.2 (2000) (citing, inter alia, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (co-
erced confessions); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right to counsel); and Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob-dominated trial)).  For a rich account of the Supreme
Court’s decisions involving the Scottsboro Boys, see Michael J. Klarman, Powell v. Alabama:
The Supreme Court Confronts “Legal Lynchings,” in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 1 (Carol
S. Steiker ed., 2006).
99 Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 362 (1964).
100 United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 798-800 (1966) (upholding indictment charging
conspiracy of law enforcement officers and private citizens to violate 18 U.S.C. § 242); see
also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 746-49, 760 (1966) (upholding indictment under 18
U.S.C. § 241 that alleged, inter alia, that private individuals conspired to keep black residents
of Georgia from exercising their rights by, inter alia, causing their arrest by false reports of
crimes).
101 See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80
VA. L. REV. 7, 145-48 (1994) (describing news coverage and its impact on public and political
opinion).
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spread revulsion they evoked served as a catalyst for the passage of national
civil rights legislation.102
It is surprising, then, to see that signature cases of the criminal proce-
dure revolution contain virtually no references to racial issues and no discus-
sion of criminal procedure as a tool to promote racial equality.103  Even in
Duncan v. Louisiana, which held that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by
jury applied to defendants in state proceedings, the Court made no reference
to the value of the jury in cases with an obvious racial component.104  The
case arose in a Louisiana parish that was in the throes of bitter and some-
times violent opposition to the court-ordered desegregation of the public
schools.105  A black man had been convicted and sentenced to sixty days
imprisonment for assaulting a white youth, though the black witnesses testi-
fied that he had headed off a confrontation between a group of black and
white students and merely touched the white youth on the arm, urging him to
head home.106  The brief for the appellant underscored the importance of the
right to trial by jury in this context:
It is plain that in cases such as this—where the personal and politi-
cal leanings of the trial judge will often be antagonistic to the de-
fendant—the potential for a factual determination that is
influenced by considerations other than the evidence of record is
very great.  This situation, particularly in civil rights related prose-
cutions in the Deep South, is not uncommon.  Because of the ac-
cepted limitation on federal review and state appellate review of
factual determinations in state trial courts, the only effective rem-
edy is to guarantee the accused the right to have the crucial factual
determination of guilt or innocence made by a jury, rather than by
a judge.  Trial by twelve jurors representing a cross-section of the
community not only dilutes the effect of any individual bias, it
tends to make certain that persons not antagonistic to the accused
will participate in the fact-finding process.107
102 See id. at 146-47.  Klarman argues that this result was anticipated by civil rights lead-
ers, who gave up hope of persuading southern whites to give up segregation and redirected
their energies to obtain support from northerners by provoking and then peacefully enduring
violent assaults by southern law enforcement and mobs. Id. at 141-46.
103 Cf. Carol S. Steiker, Introduction to CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES, supra note 98, at R
vii, ix (noting absence of “discussion of criminal procedure as a tool of racial equality” in
formal decisions of the Court in the 1960s).
104 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
105 For an exceptionally rich description of the events leading up to the Duncan opinion,
and its aftermath, see Nancy J. King, Duncan v. Louisiana:  How Bigotry in the Bayou Led to
the Federal Regulation of State Juries, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES, supra note 98, at R
261.
106 Id.
107 Brief for Appellant at 23-24, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (No. 410),
1967 WL 113845.
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Despite this invitation, the Court’s opinion in Duncan made virtually no ref-
erence to the racial context of the case.  In a brief, bland statement of facts,
the Court referred to the race of the defendant, the victim, and the wit-
nesses,108 and noted, in a single sentence, that the defendant stopped to assist
his cousins, “who had recently transferred to a formerly all-white high
school . . . [and] had reported the occurrence of racial incidents at the
school.”109  After developing the history of the jury as an institution, the
Court described the jury as “an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge,” and emphasizes the framers’ “reluctance to entrust plenary powers
over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of
judges.”110  The majority, the concurrence, and the dissent failed to make an
effort to tie those general concepts to the case before the Court, or to the
events in the South.
It is not clear why the Court failed to discuss racial equality in its crimi-
nal procedure decisions.  Carol Steiker has speculated that the focus on in-
corporation under the Due Process Clause may not have lent itself to
concerns with equality, or that “incorporation felt more universal and ‘color-
blind,’ or less controversial and ‘political,’ than overtly race-based rulings,
given the divisive politics of the time.”111  This explanation has some appeal.
Although the Gideon decision affording all defendants the right to counsel
was popular, the Court’s other major decisions were widely seen as hand-
cuffing the police and coddling criminals.112  The Republican Party was ag-
gressively pursuing southern voters in the 1960s with a strategy that
emphasized both crime control and opposition to civil rights legislation.113
In 1968, the year the Duncan decision came down, presidential candidate
Richard Nixon made law and order a major theme of his campaign.114  This
was also the year Congress passed legislation intended to overrule
Miranda.115
Although this explanation suggests that the Court may have disguised
its motivation, it seems equally possible that the Court intended to broaden
its focus from problems that affected primarily the southern states in order to
bring about national changes that would reduce the disparity in justice be-
tween rich and poor (including but by no means limited to minorities), bol-
108 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 147.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 156.
111 Steiker, supra note 103, at ix. R
112 See LUCAS A. POWE, THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 379, 391-92, 399-
400 (2000) (noting Gideon was the Warren Court’s “only popular criminal procedure deci-
sion” and describing the strong negative reaction to Escobedo and Miranda).
113 See Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do With It:  The Political, Social, Psychologi-
cal and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 40-41 (1997).
114 POWE, supra note 112, at 407-10. R
115 See id. (describing the politics of law and order during this period and the passage of
the legislative repeal of Miranda).
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ster the adversarial process, and create legal rules that would be readily
enforceable.116  Certainly, the concern with equality between rich and poor
defendants is a strong theme in the Warren Court’s criminal procedure deci-
sions.117  Ironically, however, although the Court’s own focus seemed to
have shifted away from cases that were what one scholar has called “dis-
guised race cases” to a broader conception of equality and an emphasis on
other values, the public generally perceived the later cases as race cases,
because race and crime merged in the public (or white public).118
During its halcyon days, the Warren Court issued one more decision of
note, denying relief in a capital case to a black defendant convicted by an
all-white jury in a county in which no blacks had served on a petit jury in
more than a decade.119  The Court could easily have gone the other way.  As
early as 1879, the Supreme Court had held that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits the states from excluding blacks from grand and petit juries.120
And it had also ruled in Yick Wo v. Hopkins that the discriminatory enforce-
ment of a law that is race-neutral on its face violates the Equal Protection
Clause.121  In Swain v. Alabama, decided in 1964, the Court held that the
deliberate exclusion of black jurors in an individual case violates the defen-
dant’s right to equal protection.122  However, as noted by subsequent Court
decisions, the remainder of the opinion made it virtually impossible for any
defendant to establish that claim.123  Although the prosecution had used per-
emptory challenges to remove every black juror, the Court found this insuf-
ficient to establish the necessary deliberate exclusion.124  Similarly, the Court
found the evidence that no black jurors had served for more than a decade
insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.125  Although an
all-white jury convicted the defendant and sentenced him to death for rape,
the Court was unwilling to disturb the practice of using peremptory chal-
lenges,126 and it erected an impossibly high standard for the use of statistical
116 Cf. Schulhofer, supra note 32, at 16-17 (describing three themes of Warren Court’s R
decisions as:  (1) an “egalitarian impulse . . . to stamp out not only racial discrimination but
also to insure fair treatment of rich and poor alike”; (2) the need to bolster the adversarial
process to check executive power; and (3) a concern for practical implementation).
117 See POWE, supra note 112, at 379-99. R
118 Id. at 386 (noting that Gideon was “the last important purely southern criminal proce-
dure case” and arguing that the public perception of later decisions was influenced by its
conflation of race and crime).
119 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
120 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879).
121 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
122 Swain, 380 U.S. at 203-04.
123 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92-93 (1986) (“Since . . . Swain has placed on
defendants a crippling burden of proof, prosecutors’ peremptory challenges are now largely
immune from constitutional scrutiny.”).
124 Swain, 380 U.S. at 210, 221-22.
125 Id. at 223-24.
126 The Court explained:
In the light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it serves in a
pluralistic society in connection with the institution of jury trial, we cannot hold that
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or historical evidence to create a prima facie case of purposeful discrimina-
tion by the prosecutor.
Adding Swain to the mix highlights the Supreme Court’s reluctance to
regulate or review exercises of prosecutorial discretion.  Although Swain
was later overruled in Batson v. Kentucky,127 Batson remains an outlier. Bat-
son and its progeny128 are the only line of authority that offers any real means
of challenging the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.129  The Court has
rebuffed other efforts to take a more active role in overseeing the enormous
discretion exercised by prosecutors, despite troubling evidence that this dis-
cretion is being exercised in a discriminatory fashion.
In McCleskey v. Kemp,130 in which the defense introduced a very so-
phisticated statistical study showing a significant racial discrepancy in the
application of the death penalty in Georgia, the Court addressed the issues
involving jury decision-making but dismissed out of hand claims of
prosecutorial discrimination at the charging stage.131  As reviewed in Justice
Blackmun’s dissent, however, the defense study demonstrated that (1) Geor-
gia prosecutors advanced black defendant/white victim cases to the death
penalty stage at a much higher rate than similar cases involving black vic-
tims; (2) racial factors at this stage were statistically significant after exclud-
ing other variables; and (3) the decision-making at this stage was
unstructured and subject to abuse.132  This showing, Justice Blackmun ar-
gued, would have been sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimi-
the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor’s reasons for the exercise
of his challenges in any given case.  The presumption in any particular case must be
that the prosecutor is using the State’s challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury to
try the case before the court.  The presumption is not overcome and the prosecutor
therefore subjected to examination by allegations that in the case at hand all Negroes
were removed from the jury or that they were removed because they were Negroes.
Any other result, we think, would establish a rule wholly at odds with the peremp-
tory challenge system as we know it.  Hence the motion to strike the trial jury was
properly denied in this case.
Id. at 222.
127 476 U.S. at 96.
128 Batson was later extended to sex-based peremptory challenges. See J.E.B. v. Alabama
ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128-29 (1994).
129 The efficacy of Batson challenges is also in dispute. See, e.g., Jere W. Morehead,
When a Peremptory Challenge Is No Longer Peremptory: Batson’s Unfortunate Failure to
Eradicate Invidious Discrimination from Jury Selection, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 625, 633 (1994)
(“Despite the Batson rule’s noble purpose, it cannot prevent clever lawyers from using per-
emptory challenges to strike potential jurors based upon impermissible rationales so long as
they pretend to use other, permissible bases.  Lawyers will continue to strike, with impunity
. . . .”); Alan Raphael, Discriminatory Jury Selection:  Lower Court Implementation of Batson
v. Kentucky, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 293, 318 (1989) (noting that such challenges have failed
“[i]n the overwhelming majority of reported cases implementing Batson”).
130 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
131 Id. at 296-97, 311-13.
132 Id. at 356-57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the prosecutor was five times more
likely to seek the death penalty in black defendant/white victim cases than black defendant/
black victim cases and three times more likely to seek the death penalty in black defendant/
white victim cases than in white defendant/black victim cases).
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nation by jury commissioners,133 but the Court was not willing to pierce the
veil of prosecutorial discretion.  Similarly, in United States v. Armstrong, the
Court reversed a decision providing discovery to a defendant who alleged
that prosecutors were exercising their discretion in a discriminatory fashion
in drug cases.134  Having held that the defense must prove purposeful dis-
crimination to establish that a prosecutor has violated equal protection, the
Court denied the procedural tools necessary to establish that such discrimi-
nation had occurred.135
The Supreme Court’s cases from the criminal procedure revolution evi-
denced little explicit concern with racial equality or the distortions that race
may produce in the criminal justice system, and—excepting the use of per-
emptory challenges—they do not subject prosecutorial decision-making to
judicial review or oversight.  The Court’s decisions seek to ensure the fair-
ness of the process through other means:  providing the defendant with
counsel, with the right to trial by jury, and with other procedural protections
during the investigation and trial.
Whatever the assessment of the efficacy of these decisions in criminal
cases, there is an important missing link in juvenile cases because the Court
stopped short of requiring the states to provide the right to trial by jury in
juvenile proceedings.136  Indeed, the case in which the Court refused to ex-
tend the jury to juvenile proceedings had obvious racial overtones:  it in-
volved black North Carolina children who were found to be delinquent
because of their actions during civil rights demonstrations protesting school
assignments.137  Even more important, as Part III explains,138 prosecutorial
discretion is enormously important in juvenile cases, particularly in states
like Louisiana where the reforms of the 1990s have increased the prosecu-
tor’s unreviewable authority to prosecute juveniles in the criminal courts.
133 See id. at 349-50 (describing test under Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493-94
(1977)).
134 517 U.S. 456, 470-71 (1996).
135 See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution:  Discovering the Pit-
falls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 606 (1998) (“The Armstrong ruling will pre-
vent many defendants who were selectively prosecuted from gaining discovery, and thereby
ensure that many meritorious claims will never be proven.”); Marc Michael, Note, United
States v. Armstrong:  Selective Prosecution—A Futile Defense and Its Arduous Standard of
Discovery, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 675, 713-18 (1998) (explaining the background of Armstrong
and criticizing the standard of review for making it “nearly impossible” to prove selective
prosecution).
136 See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. R
137 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 536-38 (1971).  The Court consolidated two
cases, one from Pennsylvania, and the other involving the North Carolina school protests.  The
North Carolina juvenile court had entered custody orders declaring each of the juveniles a
“delinquent ‘in need of more suitable guardianship’ and committing him to the custody of the
County.” Id. at 537-38.  The juvenile court then “suspended these commitments and placed
each juvenile on probation,” with several conditions that could result in their probation being
revoked:  in addition to the condition that they not violate any State laws, the juveniles were
also required to report monthly, to be home by eleven p.m. each evening, and to attend an
approved school. Id. at 538.
138 See supra notes 56-94 and accompanying text. R
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B. Race and the Statutory Reforms of the Juvenile Justice Systems
The statutory reforms of the 1990s described in Part III were, at least in
part, responses to high rates of adult and juvenile crime.139  An increase in
youth homicide rates was especially alarming to the public.140  National polls
identified crime as the most important problem facing the nation each year
from 1994 to 1998, and those surveyed ranked it only slightly lower in 1999
and 2000.141  Additionally, although crime rates fell dramatically during the
1990s, a large proportion of the public believed that crime was still on the
rise.142  The public generally favored harsher sentences as a response.  In
every year from 1980 to 1998, more than 74% of respondents in a national
poll believed that the courts in their area did not deal harshly enough with
criminals.143  The public also believed that juvenile crime was rising and that
the judicial system treated juveniles too leniently.  For example, a 1989
Time/CNN poll found that 88% of respondents believed that teen violence
was a more serious problem than in the past, and 70% thought that “lenient
treatment of juvenile offenders by the courts” was partly to blame for the
situation.144  A 1993 poll found that 73% of respondents were in favor of
trying violent juveniles as adults rather than in the “‘lenient juvenile
courts.’” 145
The effect of the high crime rates was magnified exponentially by the
actions of politicians and the news media.  Politicians campaigned on the
crime issue, and the news media responded to economic and market condi-
tions by reshaping the volume and content of crime coverage in ways that
promoted punitiveness.  Although the precise mechanisms are not yet fully
understood, racial attitudes and imagery seem to have played an important
role in increasing the public’s support for harsh policies such as those de-
scribed in Part III.  Moreover, these policies have fallen most heavily on
minorities because they commit crimes at a higher rate than other groups,
and this disproportionate impact has been magnified by the unconscious ra-
cism and stereotypes that affect individual decisions at each stage of the
process.
139 See, e.g., FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 29, at 197-208 (comparing increases in juvenile R
and adult crime and noting that “[t]he intersection of race, guns, and homicide fanned the
public and political ‘panic’ that, in turn, led to the recent get-tough reformulation of juvenile
justice waiver and sentencing policies”); see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS,
CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM:  LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1997) (arguing that U.S. crime
rates overall are not higher than those of other nations and that policymakers should focus on
violent crime).
140 FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 29, at 205. R
141 Beale, supra note 56, at 418. R
142 Id. at 418-19.
143 Id. at 420.
144 Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., How the Media Misrepresents Juvenile Policies, CRIM. JUST.,
Winter 1998, at 37 (citing a Time/CNN poll).
145 Klein, supra note 77, at 374 (citing a USA Today poll). R
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i. Politics, Pundits, and Super-Predators
As noted above,146 the legislative changes in the juvenile justice system
reflected a move away from the traditional emphasis on rehabilitation to-
ward tougher, more punitive treatment of juvenile as well as adult criminals.
Crime became a hot button political issue, and a central theme in many polit-
ical campaigns.147  Conservative calls for “law and order” began in the
1960s, during the period of widespread civil rights protests, and they were
widely interpreted (and perhaps intended) as code words that invoked racial
stereotypes without being explicitly racist.148  The most famous use of such
appeals was the Willie Horton television ads in the 1988 presidential cam-
paign.149  The law and order campaigns played an important role in the Re-
publican Party’s success in realigning the political parties, increasing
Republican strength in both the South and the suburbs.150  Indeed, supporting
more punitive policies became a political necessity.151  Being soft on crime
was the new equivalent of being soft on Communism in the 1950s.  Demo-
crats tired of taking a beating on the crime issue, and, by 1992, Bill Clinton
ran on his own tough on crime platform, which included support for the
death penalty.152  Legislative proposals that were seen as tough on crime
passed with little or no opposition at the state and federal levels.153
Juvenile crime became a particularly hot political issue twice in the past
four decades, first for a brief period in the 1970s, and then again beginning
in the 1990s.154  The federal legislative movement of the 1990s that is one of
the foci of this Article was presaged by a similar development in some
states, including New York, in the 1970s.  The New York experience shows
how a single publicized case, when seized on by key political leaders, can
prompt significant legislative action.155  The case of Willie Bosket has been
146 See supra Part III.A.
147 See, e.g., Beale, supra note 113, at 40-44; Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile R
Justice:  The Warren Court and the Conservative “Backlash,” 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1538-
52 (2003).
148 See DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR:  RACIAL POLITICS
AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 221-57 (1996); Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment:  Adolescent
Criminal Responsibility and LWOP Sentences, 10 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 11, 32-33 & nn. 112-19
(2007); see also Feld, supra note 62, at 786-91 (describing political developments and the use R
of coded racial appeals).
149 See generally DAVID C. ANDERSON, CRIME AND THE POLITICS OF HYSTERIA:  HOW THE
WILLIE HORTON STORY CHANGED AMERICAN JUSTICE (1995).
150 But see JAMES M. GLASER, RACE, CAMPAIGN POLITICS, AND THE REALIGNMENT IN THE
SOUTH 186 (1996) (arguing that racial cues played little role in presidential elections where
other ideological differences were so stark that “race simply has not mattered much”).
151 For a general discussion of the problem of politicizing crime, see William J. Stuntz,
The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001).
152 See Beale, supra note 113, at 42-43. R
153 Id.
154 See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 4 (1998).
155 Id.  Legislation in other states has been traced back to a single case.  In Massachusetts,
fifteen-year-old Eddie O’Brien’s murder of his neighbor led to legislation requiring the auto-
matic transfer to criminal court of any murder charge involving a juvenile. See PETER
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widely credited with prompting a significant revision of New York’s juvenile
justice system.156  At age fifteen, Bosket (dubbed the “Baby-Faced Butcher”
by the New York press) shot and killed two subway passengers in the course
of robberies.157  Because of his age, Bosket was subject to the exclusive ju-
risdiction of the juvenile courts, and would be released at the age of twenty-
one.  Governor Hugh Carey was a Democrat facing a tough election cam-
paign in which he had been accused of bring soft on crime.158  Two weeks
after Bosket was sentenced, Carey called the New York legislature into a
special session solely for the purpose of rewriting state law to allow children
as young as age thirteen to be transferred to criminal court if charged with
murder or other extremely serious offenses.159  The legislation passed with
almost no dissent, as legislators noted the public’s “revulsion,” the pressure
to take some action, and the need for juveniles to “pay the penalty” for their
actions.160
Although juvenile justice seems to have moved off center stage for a
period of several years, it returned in full force in the late 1980s and the
1990s, which Franklin Zimring has described as a period of “legislative
frenzy.”161  During this period, both politicians and commentators/pundits
warned that the United States faced a new threat from juvenile “super-
predators.”  The term “super-predator” appears to have been coined during
this period by John DiIulio, who wrote that the United States was “sitting
atop a demographic crime bomb” and facing “ever growing numbers of
hardened, remorseless juveniles who were showing up in the system.”162
ELIKANN, SUPERPREDATORS:  THE DEMONIZATION OF OUR CHILDREN BY THE LAW 108-09
(1999) (describing the individual incident and the ensuing hysteria that led to passage of the
Massachusetts legislation).  The abduction and murder of Polly Klaas had a similar effect in
California, leading directly to the passage of the most severe three strikes law in the United
States. See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes:  Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 395, 409-22 (1997) (describing effect of Klaas’ murder in galvanizing support
for three strikes bill, including Governor Pete Wilson’s announcement of his support at her
funeral, despite widespread recognition of problems with the bill); see also JENNIFER E.
WALSH, THREE STRIKES LAWS 37-42 (2007) (describing Klaas’s murder and passage of Cali-
fornia’s three strikes law, including Wilson’s decision to support the harshest version of the
law).
156 See, e.g., FOX BUTTERFIELD, ALL GOD’S CHILDREN:  THE BOSKET FAMILY AND THE
AMERICAN TRADITION OF VIOLENCE 226-27 (1997) (describing how public outcry over Bos-
ket’s case led to passage of New York’s Juvenile Offender Act of 1978); Klein, supra note 77, R
at 383-84 (describing the Bosket case as the “straw that broke the proverbial camel’s back . . .
[starting] a national wave in favor of mandating transfer to adult criminal court for violent
young offenders”).
157 Klein, supra note 77, at 383. R
158 Id.
159 Id. at 383-84.
160 SIMON SINGER, RECRIMINALIZING DELINQUENCY:  VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE REFORM 61 (1996); see also id. at 59-68 (noting that votes in the Assembly and
Senate were 125 to 10 and 50 to 2, respectively, in favor of the bill, and citing comments of
different legislators).
161 ZIMRING, supra note 154, at 16. R
162 John J. DiIulio, The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995,
at 23.
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According to one prosecutor, they would “kill or maim on impulse, without
any intelligible motive.”163  DiIulio quotes a prisoner as describing these
juveniles as “stone-cold predators,” and he argues that they “place zero
value on the lives of their victims.”164
Many politicians employed similar rhetoric to argue that there was a
new and more dangerous form of juvenile crime.  For example, Representa-
tive Bill McCollum warned Congress of “an unprecedented surge of youth
violence that has only begun to gather momentum” and “the coming genera-
tion of ‘super-predators.’” 165  Paul McNulty, a senior Republican staffer in
Congress, warned that “America has been heavily victimized by recidivistic
teenage thugs who were quickly returned to the streets by idealistic judges,”
and that it must brace itself to respond to a new breed of “natural born
killers.”166  In California, Representative Chuck Quackenbush, a key pro-
moter of state legislation to lower the age at which children could be tried as
adults for murder, warned of the “Little Monsters we have today who mur-
der in cold blood” who must be “punished and walled off from society for a
very long period of time, if not forever.”167
A survey of the political and policy literature from this period reveals
that frequent references to juvenile super-predators were part of three broad
themes that served as the catalyst for juvenile justice legislation:  “the vi-
ciousness of the new breed of offender, the revolving door of juvenile justice
as a cause of crime, and the treatment of youths as adults as an attractive
solution to the problem.”168  As described in the next section, the media
fanned the flames of fear towards these youthful predators and helped in-
crease support for punitive juvenile justice policies.
163 Id. at 23.  DiIulio later co-authored a book that presented his arguments in greater
length. See WILLIAM J. BENNETT, JOHN DIIULIO & JOHN P. WALTERS, BODY COUNT:  MORAL
POVERTY . . . AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS (1996).  DiIu-
lio’s co-authors were neoconservative Bill Bennett, who served as Secretary of Education in
the Reagan administration and drug czar in the Bush administration, and John Walters, who
had served as Bennett’s chief of staff and later himself served as drug czar.
164 DiIulio, supra note 162, at 24, 26. R
165 ZIMRING, supra note 154, at 4-5 (citation omitted). R
166 Paul J. McNulty, Natural Born Killers?, POL’Y REV., Winter 1995, at 84, 85.
167 Barry Krisberg, The Politics of the War Against the Young, in AFTER THE WAR ON
CRIME:  RACE, DEMOCRACY, AND A NEW RECONSTRUCTION 195 (Mary Louise Frampton, Ian
Haney Lo´pez & Jonathan Simon eds., 2008) (citation omitted).  Quackenbush utilized the me-
dia, organizing a series of events at which family members of murder victims testified. Id. at
194.  Although the bill in question affected only a small number of youths, it marked an
important break with the rehabilitative tradition for juvenile offenders, and it led to additional,
more far-reaching proposals at nearly every legislative session in California. Id. at 195-97.
168 ZIMRING, supra note 154, at 6.  For example, then-Senator John Ashcroft “character- R
ized the juvenile justice system as one that ‘reprimands the crime victim for being at the wrong
place at the wrong time, and then turns around and hugs the juvenile terrorist, whispering ever
so softly into his ear, “Don’t worry, the State will cure you.”’” Klein, supra note 77, at 374 R
(quoting 143 CONG. REC. S145-01 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1997) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft)).
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ii. The Role of the News Media
The news media played a critical role in keeping crime issues before the
public and in portraying a distorted image of crime.  The news media dra-
matically increased coverage of crime—especially violent crime—even as
crime rates fell, disproportionately depicted blacks and Hispanics as the per-
petrators of crime, and triggered fears of juvenile crime and a new breed of
super-predators.  Indeed, the meteoric rise of public concern about crime as
the number one problem facing the nation came within months of a spike in
the news media’s coverage of crime.169  During this time, however, crime
rates were actually declining.170
Both entertainment and news programming use portrayals of violence
as part of an economic strategy to develop particular audiences.  Responding
to economic and market pressures, the television networks dramatically in-
creased their coverage of crime during the 1990s despite the fact that crime
rates were falling.171  For example, crime coverage was the number one topic
on local television news during the 1990s and well into the new decade.172
Detailed studies comparing crime rates with the coverage of crime demon-
strate that the incidence of crime coverage bears no relationship to the
amount or type of crime found in the local viewing area.173  Instead, local
stations manipulate crime and violence as a marketing strategy.174  Similarly,
studies of newspaper coverage of juvenile crime found no relationship be-
tween the amount or placement of the coverage and the rate of juvenile
crime.  For example, between 1987 and 1996, Hawaiian newspapers in-
creased their coverage of juvenile delinquency thirty-fold and their coverage
of gangs forty-fold, despite the fact that juvenile crime rates declined or
remained stable during that period.175
169 Jeffrey D. Alderman, Leading the Public:  The Media’s Focus on Crime Shaped Senti-
ment, THE PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE, Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 26, 26-27 & fig.1.
170 Id.
171 Crime was the leading topic covered in the networks’ dinner hour news programs
throughout the 1990s, and the number of crime stories tripled from the beginning to the end of
the decade.  Beale, supra note 56, at 422-23 (noting an increase in average crime stories per R
year, from 557 at the beginning of the decade to 1,613 at the end of the decade).  Although the
murder rate fell during this period, the number of murder stories increased five-fold. See id. at
423 (noting increase in average murder stories per year from fewer than 100 at the beginning
of the decade to more than 500 at the end of the decade).  The networks responded to greatly
increased economic pressures that made it expedient to move away from hard news and to
emphasize tabloid-style crime stories. See id. at 424-29 (noting pressure for profits from con-
glomerate corporate owners, loss of audience share, and proliferation of television news
magazines).
172 See id. at 430 nn.129-30 (collecting studies of local news content).
173 See id. at 430-32 (citing authorities, including JAMES T. HAMILTON, CHANNELING VIO-
LENCE:  THE ECONOMIC MARKET FOR VIOLENT TELEVISION PROGRAMMING (1998)).
174 The emphasis on crime in the local news depends on local viewer interest in violent
programming, not on the crime in the area.  Stations also select news topics and style of pres-
entation to establish their brand identity in the local market. See id. at 430.
175 LORI DORFMAN & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, OFF BALANCE:  YOUTH, RACE & CRIME IN THE
NEWS 18 (2001), available at http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/media.
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When the news media covered youth, it generally focused on crime and
violence.  For example, a study of television news programming in Califor-
nia found that a majority of the stories about youth also concerned violence,
and over two-thirds of the stories about violence concerned youth.176  A na-
tional study of newspaper and television coverage in 1993—at the height of
the legislative activity concerning juvenile transfers to adult court—found
that 48% of network news segments about youth concerned violence, as did
40% of newspaper stories.177  The coverage significantly misrepresented the
degree to which violent crime involved juveniles.  For example, one study of
local news programs in California found that seven of ten stories about vio-
lence involved youth, but only 14.1% of violent arrests involved young
people.178
During the early 1990s, the national newsmagazines also sensational-
ized youth violence, often presenting it in cover stories.  In 1992, for exam-
ple, Newsweek and Time published cover stories entitled “Children Without
Pity,” “Big Shots:  An Inside Look at the Deadly Love Affair Between
America’s Kids and Their Guns,” “Teen Violence:  Wild in the Streets,” and
“Kids and Guns:  A Report from America’s Classroom Killing Grounds.”179
The news media made frequent use of terms such as “super predators,”
“teen killers,” and “youthful predators.”180
Studies of media coverage found skewed crime content that implicitly
portrayed some groups, such as juveniles and minorities, as more criminally
dangerous than others.181  Researchers who studied the content of local tele-
vision programming in different areas found a disproportionate emphasis on
violent crime, especially violent crime involving black perpetrators.  For ex-
ample, in California, black violent crime was significantly overrepresented,
with Hispanic violent crime overrepresented to a lesser degree.182  Similarly,
in Philadelphia local news programming disproportionately depicted persons
of color in crime stories, and presented them primarily as perpetrators rather
than as bystanders, experts, or other participants.183  Whites were dispropor-
tionately shown as victims.184  This disparity did not reflect the offense rates
176 Lori Dorfman, Katie Woodruff, Vivian Chavez & Lawrence Wallack, Youth and Vio-
lence on Local Television News in California, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1311, 1314 (1997).
177 DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 175, at 18-19. R
178 Id. at 20.
179 Shepherd, supra note 144, at 38. R
180 Id.
181 See DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 175, at 7 (collecting existing studies of crime R
reporting by the media and finding that blacks and young people are disproportionately por-
trayed as criminals); Feld, supra note 62, at 782-86. R
182 Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr., Shanto Iyengar, Adam Simon & Oliver Wright, Crime in
Black and White:  The Violent Scary World of Local News, 1 HARV. INT’L J. PRESS/POLITICS 6,
8 (1996).
183 Daniel Romer, Kathleen H. Jamieson & Nicole J. De Coteau, The Treatment of Persons
of Color in Local Television News:  Ethnic Blame Discourse or Realistic Group Conflict?, 25
COMM. RES. 286, 292 (1998).
184 Id. at 293.
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for each group.185  On two of three stations, whites were shown more fre-
quently as victims of violence than persons of color, though at that time
victims of color outnumbered white victims four to one.186  These studies are
consistent with other research finding that crime coverage has been distorted
along racial lines, over-representing white victims as compared to black vic-
tims and depicting minorities much more frequently as criminal suspects
than as crime victims or law enforcement officers.187  There is also evidence
that the news media disproportionately depicts minorities in threatening or
menacing contexts.188
The news media has also exaggerated the prevalence of juvenile
crime,189 and, as noted above, the media in the 1990s publicized the image of
the coming wave of juvenile super-predators.  In light of this disproportion-
ate coverage, it is unsurprising that the public greatly overestimated the
prevalence of juvenile crime.  For example, one study found that juveniles
were arrested for only 9% of homicides in 1999, but the public estimated
this figure to be 43%.190
In at least one case, the local news media’s decision to increase cover-
age of juvenile crime—though there was no increase in such crime—has
been linked directly to legislative action.  In 1993, the Denver Post increased
the number of stories concerning youth crime by 168.5%, tripled the column
inches devoted to juvenile crime, and placed fourteen times more stories on
juvenile crime in section A than in the previous summer.191  The increased
coverage was dubbed Denver’s “Summer of Violence.”192  Although homi-
cides by juveniles had not increased in 1993, and in fact were less frequent
that year than in 1992 or 1994, the press treatment put the issue of youth
crime on the public agenda.  The governor called a special legislative session
and the legislature passed several punitive juvenile justice laws that had been
considered and rejected in the past.193  The experience in Colorado, though
extreme, is consistent with both survey and experimental studies supporting
the view that the news media’s market-driven focus on crime played an im-
portant role in increasing both the political salience of crime and the public
185 Id. at 294.
186 Id.
187 Id. (citing ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE
MIND:  MEDIA AND RACE IN AMERICA 78-106 (2000)).  Entman and Rojecki found that there
was a three to one disparity in the time allocated in the media to white victims as opposed to
black victims in Chicago. Id. at 81.
188 Beale, supra note 56, at 459-60 (noting research concerning portrayals in mug shots, in R
the physical custody of police, or in prison clothing).
189 See DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 175; Beale, supra note 56, at 458 n.276; Rob- R
ert K. Goidel, Craig M. Freeman & Steven T. Procopio, The Impact of Television Viewing on
Perceptions of Juvenile Crime, J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 119, 122 (2006).
190 Beale, supra note 56, at 458-59. R
191 DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 175, at 22-23. R
192 Id.
193 Id.
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support for punitive policies during the 1990s.194  The mechanism by which
the media promotes punitiveness is not presently well understood, and there
are competing theories.195  Although a full explanation of these theories is
beyond the scope of this Article, the key point for now is the evidence that
race appears to play a pernicious role.
Readers and viewers form well-developed expectations based upon
stock stories and scripts,196 and in the case of news coverage of crime, these
stock stories have a significant racial element.  A summary of research on
the content of local television news concluded that “the typical news story
on crime consists of two ‘scripts’:  crime is violent, and criminals are non-
white.”197  Many studies have documented the effects of the expectations
created by these common scripts.  For example, in one experimental simula-
tion 60% of the subjects who viewed a news broadcast that included no
perpetrator falsely recalled that they had seen the perpetrator, and 70% of
those subjects identified the unseen perpetrator as an African American.198
Similarly, subjects can more accurately recall seeing African American or
Hispanic than white perpetrators because of their stereotypes about who
commits street crimes.199
In experimental settings, the crime script’s racial element appeared to
operate as a significant cue that triggered public support of punitive policies
such as three strikes laws and capital punishment.200  For example, viewing a
news segment that included a youthful black or Hispanic crime suspect sig-
nificantly increased white experimental subjects’ support for punitive juve-
nile justice policies such as placing youths in adult detention facilities, and
194 See Beale, supra note 56, at 442-65.  Data from hundreds of experimental simulations R
and surveys has confirmed the news media’s agenda setting and priming effects.  Agenda set-
ting refers to the media’s ability to focus the public’s attention on certain issues, and many
studies confirm the common sense view that media has the power to influence the public
agenda. Id. at 442-43.  Once the news media has increased the salience of an issue by agenda
setting, the media then primes viewers and readers to believe that those issues require more
political attention, and to judge candidates by their positions on these issues. Id. at 443-44.
Experimental simulations show that the priming effect of crime stories increases the impor-
tance of presidential candidates’ positions on crime. Id. (citations omitted).  Moreover, this
effect seems to be linked to racial attitudes. Id. at 444 (citations omitted).  In an experimental
simulation, adding a crime story including a mug shot of a black suspect dramatically de-
creased the support for Democratic presidential candidate Bill Clinton, apparently bringing
stereotypes about party race allegiances to the forefront of viewers’ minds. Id. at 44-45 (cita-
tions omitted).
195 For a general discussion of the research on framing, fear, and racial typification, see id.
at 446-61.  For another overview of the research in this area, see Feld, supra note 62, at 782- R
86.
196 Beale, supra note 56, at 448-49. R
197 Gilliam et al., supra note 182, at 6, 8. R
198 Franklin D. Gilliam & Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects:  The Influence of Local Televi-
sion News on the Viewing Public, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 560, 563-64 (2000).
199 Franklin D. Gilliam & Shanto Iyengar, Super-Predators or Victims of Societal Neglect:
Framing Effects in Juvenile Crime Coverage, in FRAMING AMERICAN POLITICS 148, 156-57
(Karen Callaghan & Frauke Schnell eds., 2005).
200 Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 198, at 565-68. R
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somewhat increased their fear of crime.201  Survey research comparing the
views of individuals who watched television news regularly found that they
were substantially more likely to support punitive policies than those who
seldom watched the news, and found an even greater degree of support
among regular viewers who scored high on one measure of racist attitudes.202
Other research found that repeated exposure to media that disproportionately
represents minorities as violent criminals and whites as victims can alter
unconscious racial schema and promote punitive attitudes, although there is
evidence that the impact of such programming varies among individuals.203
What was the effect of the news media’s disproportionate and skewed
coverage of juvenile crime?  Researchers found that increased viewing of
television news is positively associated with the misperception that juvenile
crime is increasing rather than decreasing.204  It is also associated with an
overestimate of the percentage of juvenile offenders who have been impris-
oned for violent crimes and with the beliefs that imprisonment is more effec-
tive than rehabilitation for juveniles and that sentencing in juvenile cases is
race-neutral.205
iii. The Racial Impact of the New Punitive Policies
Blacks and other minorities have been disproportionately affected by
the punitive policies described in Part III, and already high rates of imprison-
ment have skyrocketed.206  Multiple factors are involved.  First, minority
201 Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 199, at 156-57, 163.  Exposure to a news segment that R
included a white victim also had a significant effect, increasing fear of random street crime,
juvenile crime, and violence, but not increasing fear of crime or support of punitive policies.
Id. at 163.
202 Gilliam & Iyengar, supra note 198, at 570-71. R
203 Id. at 560-61.
204 Goidel et al., supra note 189, at 128-35. R
205 Id.
206 At the end of 2007, there were 2,293,157 persons in local jails and state and federal
prisons. HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN,
PRISONERS IN 2007, at 6 tbl.8 (2008), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p07.
pdf.  At the end of 2006, there were 92,845 juveniles incarcerated in juvenile facilities.  Id. at 7
tbl.10.  The rate of incarceration is much higher for persons of color than for whites in both the
adult and juvenile systems.  The rate of imprisonment in local jails and state and federal pris-
ons for black males in 2007 was 3,138 per 100,000, in contrast to the rate of 1,259 per 100,000
for Hispanic or Latino males and 481 per 100,000 for white males. Id. at 4 tbl.6; see also
MARC MAUER & RYAN KING, UNEVEN JUSTICE:  STATE RATES OF INCARCERATION BY RACE
AND ETHNICITY 3 (2007) (noting black incarceration rate is 5.6 times the rate of whites, His-
panic incarceration rate is 1.8 times the rate for whites, and ratios vary substantially state to
state), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=
593; Brett E. Garland, Cassia Spohn & Eric J. Wodahl, Racial Disproportionality in the Ameri-
can Prison Population:  Using the Blumstein Method to Address the Critical Race and Justice
Issue of the Twentieth Century, 5 JUST. POL’Y J. 4, 4-6 (2008), available at http://www.cjcj.org/
files/racial_disproportionality.pdf (noting that at end of 2005, blacks made up 12% of popula-
tion and 40% of the 1,525,924 persons incarcerated in the United States and arguing that racial
disproportionality in imprisonment “is the most serious race and justice issue facing criminal
justice policymakers”); PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100:  BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA
2008, supra note 58 (evaluating impact of unprecedented rate of imprisonment). R
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youths suffer distinct social disadvantages, and they are involved in more
delinquent and criminal activities than other youth.207  For that reason, har-
sher policies naturally have a greater impact on minorities.208  Barry Feld
summarized the impact of the new laws as follows:
Recent “get tough” changes have exacerbated disproportionate
minority confinement.  The numbers of youths in custody in-
creased almost 40% between 1985 and 1995, and while white
juveniles comprised 32% of all incarcerated delinquents, black
youths comprised 43% and Hispanics 21% of all confined youths.
Within the past decade, these disparities have increased further and
minority youth, who make up 34% of the juvenile population,
comprise 62% of youths in detention and 66% of youths in correc-
tional facilities.209
Data on the effects of the new transfer laws is still relatively sparse, but the
studies to date reveal that laws are applied to minority youth disproportion-
ately.210  For example, data from the U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and De-
linquency Prevention found that black youths were more likely than whites
With regard to the juvenile justice system, the National Center for Juvenile Justice provides
information on 26,344 juveniles in custody at the end of 2006, of whom 8,167 were white and
11,089 were black. MELISSA SICKMUND, T.J. SLADKY & WEI KANG, CENSUS OF JUVENILES IN
RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT DATABOOK, OFFENSE PROFILE OF DETAINED RESIDENTS BY SEX AND
RACE/ETHNICITY FOR UNITED STATES, 2006, available at  http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/
cjrp/asp/Offense_Detained.asp.  It appears that this information is quite incomplete, however,
since the Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Prisoners in 2007 states that more than 90,000
juveniles were incarcerated in juvenile facilities in 2006. WEST & SABOL, supra, at 7 tbl.10.
In 1995, minority youth constituted 68% of the population confined in secure facilities but
only 32% of the country’s total youth population.  Roger Jackson & Edward Pabon, Race and
Treating Other People’s Children as Adults, 28 J. CRIM. JUST. 507, 512 (2000).
207 In 2005, the last year for which complete data are available, the delinquency rate for
black juveniles was 108.4 per 1,000, compared to 44.4 per 1,000 for white juveniles, and the
offense rate for black male juveniles was higher than that for other groups regardless of the
offense. CHARLES PUZZANCHERA & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUST., JU-
VENILE COURT STATISTICS 2005, at 20 (2008), available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/njcda/
pdf/jcs2005.pdf.  There have been many structural explanations for this phenomenon. See
FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 29, at 191-208; Everette B. Penn, Black Youth:  Disproportional- R
ity and Delinquency, in RACE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 47, 53-56 (Everette B. Penn, Helen Taylor
Greene & Shaun L. Gabbidon eds., 2006).
208 FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 29, at 207. R
209 Feld, supra note 148, at 38. R
210 AMANDA BURGESS-PROCTOR, KENDAL HOLTROP & FRANCISCO A. VILLARRUEL, CAM-
PAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, YOUTH TRANSFERRED TO ADULT COURT:  RACIAL DISPARITIES 9
(2006), available at http://www.nicic.org/Library/022087; M. A. Bortner, Marjorie S. Zatz &
Darnell F. Hawkins, Race and Transfer:  Empirical Research and Social Context, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE:  TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL
COURT 277, 277-320 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin Zimring eds., 2000); see also ANNE L. STAHL,
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DELINQUENCY CASES WAIVED
TO CRIMINAL COURT, 1987-1996, at 1-2 (1999) (noting that cases involving white youths were
less likely to be transferred during time period of analysis than cases involving black youths,
especially drug cases).
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to be transferred to adult court, in all relevant offense types and all age
categories.211
Although some of the differences between the rates of incarceration
reflect different rates of offending and other neutral factors,212 a wide range
of studies using different methodologies found racial disparities in the treat-
ment of juvenile offenders.  A literature review funded by the U.S. Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (“OJJDP”) found that roughly
two-thirds of the studies reported that minorities (in most cases black
youths) received more serious outcomes than their white counterparts.213
The race effects were both direct and indirect, and the greatest disparity oc-
curred at intake and detention.214
In 1992, the OJJDP created the Disproportionate Minority Confinement
initiative (“DMC”), which required states seeking OJJDP grants to deter-
mine if disproportionate minority confinement existed, to identify causes,
and to develop and implement corrective strategies.215  This requirement has
spurred additional research, and most state studies produced evidence of race
differentials in “juvenile justice outcomes that . . . [could not be] accounted
for by differential involvement in crime.”216  States that conducted rigorous
multivariate analyses found evidence of both direct and indirect effects of
race.217  Different studies identified racial effects at a variety of points in the
processing of juvenile cases (including the police decision making).218  Addi-
tionally, interviews with juvenile justice officials revealed that almost two-
thirds believed that the race of the juvenile influenced the outcome of the
case in some fashion.219
211 BURGESS-PROCTOR ET AL., supra note 210, at 8-9 (citing Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile R
Offenders in the Adult Criminal System, in 27 CRIME & JUSTICE:  A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 81,
81-167 (Michael Tonry ed., 2000)).
212 Feld, supra note 148, at 35-36 (noting that differences in local police practices, loca- R
tion of crime, and victim reaction can affect the disposition of a case).
213 Michael J. Lieber, Disproportionate Minority Confinement (DMC) of Youth:  An Anal-
ysis of State and Federal Efforts to Address the Issue, in RACE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra
note 207, at 141, 145. R
214 Id. at 145-46.
215 Penn, supra note 207, at 47, 49. R
216 Lieber, supra note 213, at 150-51. R
217 Id. at 151.
218 Id. at 150-51; see also Madeline Wordes, Timothy S. Bynum & Charles J. Corley,
Locking up Youth:  The Impact of Race on Detention Decisions, 31 J. RES. CRIME & DELIN-
QUENCY 149 (1994) (studying cases of felony defendants referred by police and detained by
the courts and finding that race had an effect after controlling for weapon use, victim injury,
and offender’s background).  Additionally, schools are an important referral source for the
juvenile court and there is evidence of racial bias in school discipline. See Bernadine Dohrn,
The School, the Child, and the Court, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 29, at R
267, 283.
219 See Penn, supra note 207, at 56. R
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A recent study of the operation of the juvenile justice system in Louisi-
ana also found evidence of racial disparity.220  It showed that black youths
were four times more likely to be incarcerated than whites.221  Black youths
account for 76.8% of the state’s secure custody population.222  Neither of-
fense severity nor prior offense history accounted for this difference.223
Black offenders received longer dispositions than whites for nearly every
offense category, and the racial disparity for time served was even greater.224
Although differential access to resources including retained counsel or
private counseling may play a role,225 considerable evidence suggests that
racially biased perceptions about minority youth play a substantial role in the
differential outcomes.  For example, one study found that probation officers
were more likely to attribute the conduct of a black youth to his bad charac-
ter, while attributing virtually the same conduct by a white offender to exter-
nal circumstances.226  Semi-structured interviews with juvenile justice
personnel in another state found that race bias often operated through nega-
tive perceptions of minority youth.  Black youth were believed to lack re-
spect for law and authority, be more criminal, and be more likely to reside in
a single parent home lacking adequate supervision; lack of respect was
judged by eye contact, dress, and demeanor.227  And a study of the effect of
unconscious racial stereotypes found that subliminal exposure to words re-
lated to the category “Black” caused juvenile probation officers to evaluate
juveniles in hypothetical cases more negatively, rating them as more violent,
more culpable, and more likely to reoffend.228  Importantly, after racial prim-
ing the probation officers also judged the hypothetical juveniles to be more
mature, i.e., “adult-like and blameworthy,” characteristics which would in-
crease their likelihood of being waived to adult court.229
These studies are consistent with other work on the impact of racial
stereotyping and unconscious bias.  For example, there is evidence that
whites generally believe that blacks are more violent than whites, and that
220 CASEY STRATEGIC CONSULTING GROUP, REDUCING JUVENILE INCARCERATION IN LOUI-
SIANA (2003), available at http://www.correctionsproject.com/tallulah/pressRoom/reports-
rulings/caseyReport.pdf.
221 Id. at 32.  At the parish level, the disparity was even greater:  blacks were incarcerated
at a rate 12.7 times greater than whites. Id.
222 Id. at 33.
223 Id. at 34-35.
224 Id. at 35-37.
225 Id. (noting effects of lack of money to pay for costly private treatments and hire a
private attorney).
226 George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juvenile
Offenders:  Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554, 555-
64 (1998) (basing conclusions on review of 233 narrative written reports by probation officers
in three counties).
227 Lieber, supra note 213, at 151. R
228 Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About
Adolescent Offenders, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 496 (2004).  Racial priming had similar
effects on police officers. Id. at 493.
229 Id. at 500.
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whites have a tendency to attribute conduct by blacks to flaws in their na-
ture, rather than situational pressures.230   Indeed, one study found a “strong
correlation between harsher sentences and stereotypically ‘Afro-centric fea-
tures,’ suggesting that even judges read such features as signs of basic char-
acter flaws.”231  Even whites who believe they are not prejudiced may
discriminate due to largely unconscious processes of situational racism, self-
fulfilling stereotypes, and a failure of imagination.232  A study of the attitudes
of residents of New Orleans revealed that both blacks and whites were
somewhat more likely to express a preference for transfer to adult criminal
court for a case involving a black juvenile than a white juvenile.233
V. CONCLUSION
This Article explores the Jena Six cases from the perspective of two
major waves of change in the juvenile justice system:  the procedural re-
forms stimulated by the Supreme Court’s decisions in the 1960s, and the
legislative reforms of the 1990s.  It concludes that the procedural revolution
provides no mechanism to challenge the prosecutorial discretion that shaped
the cases, and that the reforms of the 1990s made the system more punitive
and shifted more unreviewable authority to prosecutors.  These legislative
changes make it easier to charge teens like Mychal Bell as adults, and the
Supreme Court’s procedural rulings give juveniles no way to challenge the
prosecutor’s discretion.
The highly discretionary nature of the juvenile justice system is a
double-edged sword.  This subjective design has traditionally been in place
in order to be able to focus on the best interests and rehabilitative potential
of each child.  Yet the discretionary attributes also allow the operation of
unconscious biases to tip the balance towards harsher alternatives at various
points in the system.  Neither state law nor the federal Constitution provides
a mechanism to address it.  Traditional equal protection doctrine falls short
in several respects.  It requires proof of purposeful discrimination, and statis-
tical disparity is not sufficient to prove a prima facie case or obtain discov-
ery.  But in the juvenile system, as elsewhere, unconscious racial biases and
stereotypes are a serious problem.
Except for peremptory jury challenges, the Supreme Court has been
unwilling to provide minority defendants like the Jena Six—whether
charged as juveniles or adults—with any real tools to challenge the ex-
230 Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused:  Is Race a Factor in Convicting the Innocent?, 4
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 121, 126-27 (2006).
231 Id.
232 LU-IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION BY DEFAULT:  HOW RACISM BECOMES ROUTINE (2006)
(describing these processes). See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Blindsight:  The Absurd-
ity of Color-Blind Criminal Justice, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 6-7 (2007) (explaining how the
processes may apply in the context of criminal cases).
233 Stephen M. Feiler & Joseph F. Sheley, Legal and Racial Elements of Public Willing-
ness to Transfer Juvenile Offenders to Adult Court, 27 J. CRIM. JUST. 55, 61 (1999).
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traordinary power wielded by prosecutors, who choose whom to prosecute,
what crimes to charge, and in the case of juveniles, whether to charge them
as adults.  Supporters of the Jena Six ultimately had to take their case to a
different court, the court of public opinion.  It was under the intense scrutiny
of the national press and pressure from many advocacy groups that D.A.
Walters ultimately reduced some of the charges.  That option, of course, is
not available in the vast majority of cases.
It is time for a reexamination of the punitive juvenile justice legislation
of the 1990s, which was enacted at a time when the news media, politicians,
and experts of all stripes warned that we were facing a crime wave of un-
precedented proportions from a new and more dangerous breed of juvenile
super-predators.  The expected tsunami of violent juvenile crime never ap-
peared, and indeed juvenile crime rates have been falling since the mid-
1990s.234  Equally important, the justification for moving juvenile cases into
adult courts has been called into question.  A 2008 review of the extant re-
search found that moving cases from the juvenile to the adult system does
not reduce recidivism.235  To the contrary, the bulk of the empirical studies
concluded that transferring juveniles for trial and sentencing in the adult
courts had the “unintended effect of increasing recidivism . . . and thereby of
promoting life-course criminality.”236
234 See PUZZANCHERA & SICKMUND, supra note 207, at 6 (noting that juvenile court R
caseload increased 46% between 1985 and 2005, and that caseload peaked in 1997).  It should
be noted, however, that crimes against the person have not decreased, and in fact continued to
increase after 1995, though at a slower rate. Id.
235 RICHARD E. REDDING, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
JUVENILE TRANSFER LAWS:  AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO DELINQUENCY? 3-6 (2008), availa-
ble at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/220595.pdf.
236 Id. at 8.
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